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Claudio Ciborra’s improvisation argument provides a realistic dynamic account of how organisational practices address technology. This was developed from the study of malleable open-ended technology, but little research has occurred to investigate the theory’s validity within different settings. This paper seeks to address this gap, by examining improvisation in the context of a rigid highly structured technology. It presents findings from the successful implementation of an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system within a large international organisation, which was subsequently defined by the ERP vendor as being an ‘exemplary site’. Through the theoretical lens of Actor Network Theory, the paper reveals the improvisation, enactments and constant work around the plan that took place in dealing with the high contingencies of ERP implementation. The study extends the discussion on improvisation and contributes to an already illuminating argument. It invites practitioners to reflect on ERP implementation practice and review their evaluation methods.





One of Claudio Ciborra’s most notable contributions to the study of information systems (IS) was his critical readings of the underlying assumptions of the linear, sequential and causational perspective of strategy formulation that has been imported from rational business strategy literature to strategic information systems (SIS). He deconstructed this managerial perspective to highlight both theoretically and empirically its inadequacy in explaining the practice of everyday life within organizations (Ciborra, 1991, 1994, 2002; Ciborra and Hanseth, 1998). His work asserts that the rational management model is highly simplified and based on sweeping generalisations and abstractions (Ciborra and Hanseth, 1998). It emphasizes that the social context of an IS development extends beyond prescriptive management frameworks and the functional design of the technical systems (Ciborra and Associates, 2000; Waema and Walsham, 1990). Ciborra strongly advocated that the static language of planning, controlling, and methods need to be replaced by a new language based on improvisation, bricolage, and drift that reflects the dynamic nature of the ‘real world’, which presents a more realistic account of organisational practices in dealing with technology (Ciborra, 1999a).

The improvisation argument provided a breath of fresh air to the IS research field. Its strong explanatory capability reveals the ‘messiness of everyday practices’ and affirmed the existence of bricolage and doing with whatever available resources. Improvisation illustrates that this open-ended, subtle, and recurring action in dealing with technology could lead to major unplanned changes such as the redesigning of work practice (Orlikowski, 1996; Ciborra, 1996a). 

The improvisation argument developed by Ciborra and Orlikowski is based on empirical studies of open ended and highly tailored technologies such as groupware, intranets and the Internet. These studies focused on the use and ongoing accommodation of such customisable technologies that are so general at the user front (Orlikowski, 1996). The implementation project, even in the case of such malleable technology, has however received little attention. Where this has occurred, it is often referred to as a ‘deliberate’ planned endeavour to deliver the technology to end-users (Orlikowski, 1996).

This paper investigates whether the implementation of a rigid technology represented by Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) accommodates improvisation argument, contrasting Ciborra’s research on malleable open-ended technology. It focuses on investigating the improvisation phenomenon in the rigid and highly structured technology of ERP systems and during its perceived highly structured implementation project. ERP was selected as a contemporary example of a ‘recalcitrant technology’ with a rigidly defined hierarchy of components and operations that bear upon one another according to a set of rules determining both their functional dependence and temporal sequence (Kallinikos, 2002). ERP implementation occurs in an organisational setting different to that of groupware and other flexible technology, with a project structure and implementation methodology often specific to the system being implemented (1) in contrast to malleable technology. Also ERP – in contrast to the malleable technology – is very costly and often represents the largest single IS investment in the history of many organisations (Sumner, 2000). By focusing on ERP during its implementation, this paper aims to extend the current discussion on improvisation.

This paper draws on Actor Network Theory (ANT) to investigate ERP implementation within a large international organisation. The project was deemed a success by both the organisation and the ERP vendor, with the latter defining it an ‘exemplary site’ and acknowledging that it had learnt ‘key techniques from the implementation’ that ‘contributed to future software implementation methodology’. 

The paper is organised into six sections. The first provides a brief introduction and presentation of the research question. The second reviews the literature in improvisation, identifying perceived gaps that this research addresses. The third presents the research methodology including data collection and analysis. The fourth section presents the findings and data analysis followed by a discussion. The paper concludes by extending the discussion, in addition to presenting its contribution to theory and practice.

2	Improvisation
Improvisation argument generally regards technology as intrinsically ambiguous and something that people in the field can appropriate and make sense of as they go along (Weick, 1990, 2001). It views systems design and implementation as being subject to different localities and multiple interpretations (see for example: Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; Doolin, 1999; Avgerou, 2002; Cadili and Whitley, 2005). This approach draws largely on Weick’s research on improvisation and sense making, Mintzberg’s studies on emergent strategies, and Suchman’s work on planned and situated actions. 

Weick’s contribution to organisation science included new concepts such as ‘improvisation’, ‘bricolage’, ‘sense making’, and ‘enactment’, used to express his action oriented view of the organisation. He proposes that ‘solid facts’ are actually ongoing accomplishments that are sustained as much by intense action as by accurate diagnosis, in order to stress that emergent organizational action becomes visible only after the fact. As a result, organisational plans are perceived as pieces of history and not pieces of architecture (Weick, 1993). Weick (1993, 1989) posited that people attempt to make sense of their surrounding by being both proactive and reactive. Whatever they do provides a pretext to future interpretation and actions. This suggests that sense making occurs amidst a continuous flow of movement that surrounds the actors as they attempt to coordinate their continuous flow of inputs (Weick, 1989). Such action-oriented behavior resembles the composition and performance of jazz music, in which composition and performance occur simultaneously (Zack, 2000). 

Weick adopts a balanced view of improvisation as a blend of both the pre-composed and the spontaneous, following Berliner’s (1994) definition that ‘improvisation involves reworking pre-composed material and designs in relation to unanticipated ideas conceived, shaped, and transformed under the special conditions of performance, thereby adding unique features to every creation’ (Berliner, 1994). From this perspective, improvisation is centred around processes and designs that are continuously being reconstructed (Weick, 1993). This continuous action and reconstruction by surrounding actors produces new versions of the situation to act upon, defined as ‘enactment’.

Weick (1993) states that ‘plans are based on assumptions of ideal conditions and envision stable solutions to a set of current assumed stable problems’, and proposes that the plan acts as a map that creates and labels the territory in which action takes place within a socially constructed world (Weick, 1989). Improvisation views action as a process of sense making that makes do with whatever materials at hand, which builds on the notion of ‘bricolage’ (2) from Levi-Strauss’ (Weick, 1993, 2001; Levi-Strauss, 1966). The term acknowledges the consistent misfit between the resources and the exact project to be accomplished, emphasising that these ill resources are all what is available and it is up to the organisational ‘bricoleur’ to make do with these resources. To illustrate this, Weick (1987) presents an interesting example of a military unit that became lost in the Alps during manoeuvres but which subsequently found its way after discovering a map to follow. Later, the unit’s lieutenant discovered to his surprise that the map his unit had been following was of the Pyrenees, and not the Alps. Weick theorises that it was only their continuous action, and not the map itself, that saved the unit (Weick, 1987). 

Mintzberg (1994) describes the ‘fallacy’ of the prescriptive planning approach. He theorises that this provides an idealised view of how strategies are supposed to be made, in contrast to the reality of how they are actually made. He introduces the notion that strategies emerge through a ‘fluid process of learning’ (Mintzberg, 1987), which appears without clear intentions as people undertake actions one by one, then respond to them so that patterns eventually form. Mintzberg (1987) suggests that strategy formulation and implementation ‘walk on two feet’: one deliberate and the other emergent. The decision maker typically starts on one foot and waits until the move of the other foot takes place, then starts to move the first one again, and so on. This implies that a purely deliberate or emergent strategy does not exist, but rather, a mix of both is most likely. 

In contrast to structured strategic approach, emergent strategy ‘enables management to act before everything is fully understood – to respond to an evolving reality rather than having to focus on a stable fantasy’ (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). In this way, objectives may not be defined at the beginning of the process, but may emerge gradually through a process of formation and learning (Mintzberg, 1994). In this context, strategy formation is an ongoing process that combines ‘seeing and doing’ with a more conventional approach of ‘thinking and planning’ (Mintzberg and Westley, 2001), and emergent strategy incorporates the notions of enactment and improvisational action.

Suchman (1987) defines improvisation as action that takes place in order to fill in the gap between routine organisational procedures and actual events occurring in the course of the daily flow of work (Suchman, 1987). Ciborra adopts a similar perspective on improvisation to Weick’s, viewing it as a simultaneous mixture of intuition, competence, design and chance, contending that action intermingles the contours of the problematic situation with plans for problem solving and the deployment of resources (Ciborra, 1999b). Ciborra posits that in an after-the-fact analysis, the unfolding improvisation can be backtracked and connected to rational decision making encompassing goal definition, information gathering, planning, and choice. He explains that this foregrounding of rational decision making is what appears in many of the managerial presentations on IS development (Ciborra, 2002). Ciborra also recognises the existence and relevance of plans and acknowledges that improvisation contains elements of planning and design: ‘the plans, the means-ends chain are there and they are relevant, but they are just the tip of the iceberg’ (Ciborra, 1999c). Through a theoretical and philosophical analysis, Ciborra argues strongly that improvisation is grounded in real practices and that planning, decision models, and methods are in contrast ‘de-rooted’ (Ciborra, 1999b). 

Ciborra conducted a number of empirical case studies on IS in organisations. These primarily, if not exclusively, focused on technologies such as the Internet, intranets, and groupware applications, where the contingencies of improvisation, bricolage, and sense making could be clearly expressed. His illuminating study of groupware applications in a number of international organisations reveals improvisation activities and the ‘drifting’ nature of technology in use (Ciborra, 1996b). For Ciborra (2002), this drift ‘is about technology in use, as experienced and seen from the swamp of contingent situations and practices [emphasis added]’, with the eventual use of an ‘open’ technology often varying from the initial plans. Having identified drift as being made of bricolage and improvisation and about open technology in use, Ciborra left an open question of what happens to a highly structured technology during implementation?. 

In another study, he presents the story of diffusion and use of the Internet and intranet in a pharmaceutical company. He discovered that this did not conform to a plan or a strategic approach, but reflected improvisation, mushrooming, cultivation, and bricolage (Ciborra, 2000b). He compares this with highly structured ERP projects, citing the example of an SAP implementation, and proposes that low-cost and low-risk projects enjoy a relaxed managerial approach that encompassed ‘releasement’, ‘nurturing’, and ‘cultivation’, versus a formalised strategic planning regime. He stated, ‘if nobody seems to have a clue where all this will lead to, nobody seems to be panicking about it either’ (Ciborra, 2000b). Ciborra however offers little on what the implementation of costly, high risk, less flexible, and highly structured technology entails. 







Drinko is a global food and beverages company ranked within the top 10 in its industrial sector. Drinko owns numerous production, packaging, and sales sites around the world. Each of these  is comprised of a company or group of companies that operate locally. This case study focuses on Drinko’s business units (BUs) within the UK and ‘EUB’ (a disguised name for another country). Approximately 25 BUs are encompassed by these two regions. 

In 1998, Drinko launched an organisation-wide 3 years project in order to implement SAP to replace the existing 225 systems around the company. Drinko identified five business processes as being ‘in scope’: sales and operations planning, product supply, procurement, customer order fulfilment, and finance. The project was divided into six phases: mobilisation, analysis and conceptual design, detailed design, build and test, transition, and in service.  This case focuses on the first three phases of implementation, and the role of the SAP project team. The project team was sourced from internal business staff and four consulting firms, disguised and presented according to their functional contribution: Initial Consultants, Business Consulting, Technical Consulting, and Training Consulting. 

Although the implementation took 4 years (1997–2001), Drinko’s senior management formally announced that the project had successfully been completed in 3 years, as planned not taking account of  slippage that occurred during the first three phases. The cost of the project reached over £40 million, which was nearly £3 million over the initial budget.

2.2	Data collection and analysis
The research follows an interpretive approach of inquiry, which seeks to understand the phenomena from the viewpoint of the participants and their social and cultural context (Kaplan and Maxwell, 1994; Schwandt, 1994; Myers, 1997). It aims to explore the nature of organisational action during the implementation of the ERP system and to provide ‘deep insight’ into the investigated phenomena (Walsham, 1995; Klein and Myers, 1999: 67).  

Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 13 members of staff working on the project between August 2000 and March 2001. In addition, data were collected informally from two other members of the project team in 1999 and early 2000, prior to the commencement of the formal interviews. Interviews lasted between 1 and 3 hours, and were not tape-recorded at the request of Drinko, due to the sensitivity of the information being discussed. Transcripts of the interviews were subsequently produced, with additional observations and notes made after the conclusion of each interview. Where required, participants were re-interviewed at a later date, or contacted via e-mail or telephone to seek further clarification. This methodology provided multiple perspectives on topical issues, in addition to the development of an understanding of the relevant controversies, negotiations, and resolutions. Documents were reviewed including company newsletters; versions of the project’s business case; internal project reports; two consultancy reports; the business consultants’ implementation methodology, and a final project report.  

Data were analysed utilising various approaches. Interview data were divided according to criteria that included;  actors, events, organisational level, and issues resolutions,  which was useful in focusing on different themes and the details involved. In addition, interview notes, related material, and documents were re-read systematically in chronological order, which provided a useful way to understand the context, develop a sense of the situation and the whole stream of actions involved, and the project progress over time (Vaughan, 1996). This hermeneutic circle (Gadamer, 1976; Klein and Myers, 1999) aided in the construction of a clear picture of the project, its events, incidents, people, and artefacts involved.  

All names and locations have been disguised at the request of the Organisation. Quotes that express many informants’ point of view are reported by presenting one indicative quote without a reference to the source.  

3	ANT and improvisation 

The case study analysis is guided by the conceptual framework of ‘ANT’ (Latour, 1987, 1988a, 1996, 2004, 2005). The dynamics and empirical orientation of this theoretical perspective provide a relevant account of emergent action, due in particular to its premise that the development of any project is contingent. Law and Callon remark that the sociotechnical process of a project is ‘interactive and emergent [and] their course and fate are not easily predicted [emphasis is added]’ (Law and Callon, 1988). This interactive and emergent nature is depicted by Callon and Law (1982) as follows: ‘all actors are constructing interest maps all the time.... These then are working maps and they are not static but they are reflexively related to actors’ conceptions of their own interests. As more data about the social world are produced and made relevant so their conceptions of the interests of both themselves and others are liable to change’ [emphasis added]. 

A central theme in ANT is the assimilation of alliances by an actor in order to facilitate the pursuit of a specific goal. These alliances are comprised of other actors (human and non-human) gathered and aligned to support the network builder and achieve his goals (Latour, 1987). This process of displacement is called translation and could be achieved through different strategies (Latour, 1987). Callon (1986) clearly defines the anatomy of translation in terms of ‘four moments of translation’: ‘problematisation’, ‘interessement’, ‘enrolment’, and ‘mobilisation’. He asserts that these moments are interrelated and could be inseparable in reality (Callon, 1986). 

The initial moment of translation, problematisation, as the term implies, deals with finding a problem for the presented solution to which other entities could subscribe to. In order to do this, the ‘enunciators’ need to define the other actors’ identities, what they might possibly want and make themselves or other entities as an obligatory passage point. By becoming the obligatory point of passage, the network builders define the way for the actors to proceed if they to realise their goals. Interessement is the action of interest building. During interessement, interest building occurs by the enunciator, as it attempts to impose and stabilise the identity of the other actors it defines through its problematisation (Callon, 1986: 207–208). This process carries the risk that actors may refuse the identification of their identities and define their identity, goals, projects, motivations, or interests in another manner (Latour, 1987, 1988b). 

If successful, problematisation and interessement lead to enrolment. During this moment, actors accept the roles that have been defined for them during interessement, but which do not imply or exclude, pre-established roles. This moment often entails conflict and struggle, as attempts are made to convince other actors to play the roles they have been ascribed (ibid.). Enrolment may occur through seduction, transaction, and consent without discussion (Latour, 1987, 1988a), with efforts made to pull entities toward the enunciator’s proposal. The last moment of translation is mobilisation. This occurs as wider acceptance of the proposal eventuates. In order to communicate with other actors outside of the network, the network builder creates immutable mobiles. These are mobile objects such as a text, which are capable of reaching and convincing entities to join the network without affecting its relationships or equilibrium (Latour, 1990). 

Translation does not necessarily occur in well-defined, linear steps. In reality, moments (tactics) and strategies overlap (Callon, 1986: 203) and ‘are never as distinct as they are [presented]’ (ibid., 224). Callon (ibid.) theorises that during the process of translation the identity of actors, the possibility of interaction, and the margins of manoeuvre are negotiated and delimited. He depicts these as items of interest for researchers, contrasting this with an approach that identifies and separates the tactics of translation (ibid.). He warns that an approach that adopts this more ‘literal’ examination of the moments of translation could lead to a linear analysis that is devoid of the complexity and essence of the very situation it seeks to assess. In adhering to the approach advocated by Callon and other actor network theorists (Law and Callon, 1988, 1992; Callon and Law, 1989), the moments of translation have been ‘loosely’ applied in the analysis of the case study data and assessment of the research questions at Drinko.

4	Findings from the case study: an ANT reading

4.1	The initial claim and associations 

The SAP project started with a claim articulated by the IT director of SmCo, one of Drinko’s small European companies, that SAP had brought significant benefits for SmCo that exceeded expectations. In a Drinko IT conference, he succeeded in convincing the attendees, including Drinko’s CEO, that this SAP success in SmCo could be repeated within Drinko. He also convinced the CEO that he would be capable of delivering this success across the organisation through an integrated organisation-wide SAP system. The CEO believed that ‘as he [SmCo’s IT director] succeeded there [in SmCo’s SAP implementation], he would here [at Drinko] as well’. For this reason, the CEO selected the IT Director of SmCo to become the IT director of Drinko, forming a core alliance for the SAP project network. They decided to extend the network of alliances to pursue their idea. 

The Board played the role of money provider and the highest approval authority in Drinko requiring all significant investments to be referred to it for review. Hence, large investments and big projects could be pursued only with the Board’s approval and budget allocation. To interest the Board, the aligned IT director and CEO needed – following the business tradition – to prepare a business case document through which they could translate the Board’s interests and channel it towards an organisation-wide SAP Implementation. To do so, they had first to mobilise the single system into their network finding a credible speaker on its behalf to spell out what it can offer for Drinko. They therefore hired a consultant company, the Initial Consultants, to speak on behalf of the system and to work alongside an IT manager from Drinko to prepare the required document. 

This document presented the single system as the only favourable scenario, while appearing to explore all possible options, including the ‘do nothing’ option that is traditionally identified in such a business case. The business case proposal served its purpose as a translation tool by successfully recruiting the Board to join the implementation network of SAP. It was then sent to the BUs involved as an immutable mobile object that would be taken for granted and hence move around to interest and enrol others without being altered. It was supposed to reach out for the BUs’ internal networks, interest and unproblematically recruit them guaranteeing their commitment to the project and holds itself stable and unchanged during this process.

4.2	Trials to translate the BUs involved

The joining of the SAP project was taken for granted as a black box that BUs would undoubtedly subscribe to by nominating their best managers to join the project team. However, this effortless subscription to the project proved to be unrealistic, as the following two examples indicate.

4.2.1	Counter-translation in America BUs

In moving from its constructed network towards the BUs, the project’s immutable mobile was surprisingly challenged. The America BU did not welcome the ‘close connections’ to UK(4) that this system would bring. It had another objective at that time, which was to increase its physical distribution capabilities, and hence it was occupied in exploring the idea of merging with another company in that market. So the America BU was not willing to change its agenda for what they saw as an internal UK matter that came ‘out of the blue’ and about which it had not been consulted beforehand (a Manager from America BU on a visit to the UK office). 

Drinko America refused to follow the project network’s determined path and started to negotiate with the project team. During this negotiation, the America BU tried to refute all the operational reasons given by the SAP project team to join. In this way, UK’s interests in implementing the integrated system were challenged and interrupted by the America BU interest in a merger. The America BU redefined the UK and displaced its goal of implementing the SAP system and translated it to be primarily seeking efficiency and reducing operational cost. They then convinced UK team that the proposed merger would be the only right detour to achieve the aim (the new translated aim) in this market. 

This line of argument was also supported by a counter-document that threaten the UK project team that if the merger did not take place ‘no one would benefit from that’ and ‘all of [them] would suffer’ (Internal report). This counter translation succeeded to convince UK to exclude America BU from joining the project network and therefore the project scope was reduced and a new document was produced to reflect this new reality. 

4.2.2	Bringing in a powerful actor in EUB translation 

According to the initial business case and plan, the organisation-wide SAP project intended to cover several BUs. As the America BU succeeded in translating the UK interests and convinced them to adopt its goals, EUB was left as the only BU outside UK’s borders to be convinced to join the SAP project.

The historical relations between UK and Drinko EUB kept each network isolated in a clustered regional relationship. Revenues were the only flow between them and the only intermediary from EUB to UK. From UK point of view, EUB would expect to do ‘just the opposite of whatever [they] say, just because it comes from [UK]’. Being aware of the sensitivity between the UK and EUB and the need to avoid repeating the slippage that occurred in the America case, the project network realised that it needed to adopt a careful translation strategy for EUB (see Elbanna 2007 for more details).

When the project management from UK approached Drinko EUB executives to discuss the new SAP system, it found that interesting them, and encouraging them to interest others in their network, required the enrolling of a strong actor who could convince them and pull their whole network towards the UK. Thus, project management enrolled the EUB location and appointed it to be the official project location. In doing so, they followed EUB interest in gaining an explicit organisation-wide recognition that assures its identity. Angering the UK’s project members by flying them all to EUB would be a strong statement of recognition of EUB role. A statement by the CEO – that the project chose a location within EUB’s territory because it had the required expertise – displaced Drinko EUB and channelled it towards joining the project network and pursuing the network’s goals. It was through this un-pre-planned in-formalised move during the project that UK succeeded in mobilising EUB to join the SAP project network. This appeared on-the-fly move reflects deep experience and skilful translation of EUB that had a large effect on the project in line with Ciborra’s theorisation on malleable technology (Ciborra, 2002). 

4.3	Clash of problematisations and efforts to re-align 

The first phase of the project, ‘mobilisation’, ended up with documents specifying the reduced new scope of the project after the America withdrawal, as well as the teams involved, members’ names, and responsibilities. These were prepared at the project’s top management level and were supposed to stabilise the constructed network and carry it through the following project phases. The teams continued to work on the next phase, namely the ‘analysis and conceptual design’, that was a more exploratory exercise, with teams mainly occupied by mapping the processes in different BUs to help understand the general requirements of each unit, in addition to understanding the capability of the system. 

The initial objectives of the SAP project were to enable Drinko to meet increased worldwide demand profitably; to give people access to accurate information quickly so that they can make decisions fast; and to simplify core processes and systems across what have been traditionally regarded as separate regional operations. However, according to their initial translation different teams and different BUs identified the objectives in a different way. In EUB, the project was seen to be primarily about a system that needed to be put in place according to a certain schedule. For UK, it was a way of making transparent and changing the long hidden EUB processes and data. Each process team also translated the project into something different. For the operations planning team, for example, it was aimed at establishing one sales plan for all Drinko but this was abandoned by the sales team, who saw it as a project to create end-to-end sales ordering and accounting processes.  

By the end of the second phase of the project, analysis and conceptual design, the deliverables of each team varied according to their understanding of the project. This difference in deliverables has been largely affected by the initial problematisation that the project team tailored for each party involved in order to interest and ensure their commitment to the project. It became obvious to top management that they needed to retranslate the parties involved and reset the objectives of the project, as the above scattered aims did led to ‘confused’ and ‘different’ deliverables. Drinko top managers were aware that having ‘solid objectives’ would help in establishing a well performing network, and the business consultants advised them to refine and simplify the objectives of the system to one that people would remember and focus on. 

During brainstorming meetings to simplify the objectives and reduce them to only one, the top management found that keeping the historically distanced EUB enrolled in this project network alongside their UK counterparts was the main challenge facing the project. They realised that obtaining such an enrolment and stabilise it through inscribing it in the implemented system would be the most favourable achievements this system could reach, something that had not been achieved before. This resulted in the launching of a new project’s objective: ‘to unify the business’ combined with a new two-coloured jigsaw logo. 

The previous ad hoc re-problematisation, however was not in the project plan, was an important quick plan and action to meet an emerging problem of having different orientation and understanding of the project deliverables. The improvised re-problematisation of the project was engaging for the parties involved. It was particularly appealing to EUB, which felt that this large project was a good chance to gain equality with UK, especially after UK staff had been ‘dragged all the way’ to run the project from their new location in EUB. For the reluctant UK staff, who were ‘not very happy of course’ with their ‘displacement’ to the EUB, ‘integrating the business’ was accepted as ‘a challenging mission to deliver’ a system of unprecedented control over EUB. The project therefore became the only way to absorb EUB in their network ‘once and forever’.

4.4	The reversing of the project network
Many controversies and negotiations appeared in the subsequent third phase, ‘detailed design’, which threatened what was hoped to be a stabilised network. For example, controversies were opened surrounding the team construction, the Business Consultants, the SAP capability, and the construction of a shared service centre as follows.

4.4.1	Back to primary networks

The project team consisted of five separate teams implementing the five chosen modules of SAP. The teams were assigned to two buildings in EUB. Some teams had more EUB members than their UK counterpart and some consisted purely of UK staff. Teams tended to be polarised according to their original primary networks that existed before the construction of the project, into UK and EUB ignoring the newly constructed project network. Teams from the UK preferred to keep their perceived superior network bounded in a separate building following their tradition of organising, scheduling, work style, and using their favourite project software that is widely used in the UK network. EUB teams also pursued their objectives through creating its own work style, schedules and milestones, and used other ‘outdated’ and ‘old packages’ (from the UK point of view) for diagrams and charts. 

In their dismay of being part of the same network with EUB and their desire to return to regional polarised relationship, the UK teams found the delay of some teams schedule by the end of phase three a good opportunity to complain about EUB counterparts. They tried to translate top management interest in project success and channels it towards excluding EUB from the project teams by claiming that EUB involvement affected their delivery, causing delays and uncertainties about the quality and direction of the project. They also juxtaposed with SAP to claim that this integrated system required some processes to be integrated, such as finance and procurement, and that EUB lack of communication would jeopardise the system’s configurations and integration (Elbanna, 2003). 

Top management had to deal with the emergent delay in teams’ delivery and UK teams’ warning regarding the integration of the system’s configuration, they decided that better cooperation and streamlining between teams required some enforcement. Therefore, they accepted the UK teams’ proposal to restructure and amalgamate some teams to ‘force them to work together’, which effectively marginalised EUB for the rest of the project. The management response however favours one party over the other and followed a certain translation of teams’ delay (UK translation) represents an immediate and improvised action to solve a rising problem. They had to re-work the project structure and composition disregarding the plan in order to achieve harmony and ensure delivery.

4.5	Counter-enrolment of other systems

Until the start of the third phase of the implementation, ‘detailed design’, the system was envisaged as a single integrated SAP. The SAP project teams and their collaborating consultants followed that claim and tried to stick to a standard ‘vanilla implementation’ of SAP. In approaching their potential network actors, the project sub-teams were faced by different problematisation and counter-enrolment of different technologies. For example, when the operation planning process team conducted seminars to discuss with users the new processes and how the new system would handle them, they found users were unconvinced that the new SAP system could support the operations planning process. They were already using another packaged software, Manugistics, to manage production planning and therefore opened the black box of SAP functionalities and compared it to their Manugistics system doubting the SAP capability. 

The project team tried to enrol the users in their vanilla implementation project, yet users did not subscribe to that and at the same time realised that the project team involved would not accept anything but a vanilla implementation and that any attempt to convince them to amend SAP would be hopeless. Accordingly, users made it explicit that ‘this SAP won’t work’ and set the continued use of Manugistics as a little deviation from the project plan that would still lead to the main goal of a vanilla implementation of SAP. They translated the project team’s interest in such a vanilla implementation by keeping SAP unchanged and offered interfacing it with Manugistics. They supported their argument by bringing in different actors who already used the package, including another recently merged company and some competitors. In that way, UK users succeeded in convincing the project team to work out of their initial plan of having one single integrated system that spanned the whole organisation and retain Manugistics to handle production planning in all BUs. 

Users in different departments continued to offer similar detours to the project teams, compelling the latter to work out different solutions in order to ensure the membership of different users into the project networks. For example, the product supply team was pushed to accept interfacing SAP with another package for statistics and graphics in order to keep the product supply staff enrolled and committed to the implementation of the system. They also had to please Drinko management who was not satisfied with the reporting functionality of SAP, by complementing it with a packaged decision support system and data warehouse that they felt had better reporting capabilities. Recruiting and ensuring the alignment of different actors in that way meant working out different translations and accepting some detours that were partially out of what was planned for (Elbanna, 2008). 

4.6	Polarising the system’s network

The project team followed the organisation inscription of SAP that requires gathering all the organisation services into one centre. They adopted this goal as it presents one of the major advantages of having an integrated system such as SAP that reduces the operational costs and improves efficiency. In Drinko context, this worked against the primary networks of Drinko that were deeply rooted and difficult to dissolve in favour of the project goal. Therefore, controversies were raised regarding the location of the project management suggested single service centre.





The previous section reveals that the implementation efforts of integrated packaged software such as ERP could be conceptualised as a practice of network building and alignment of different actors to pursue the network builders’ goals. The study demonstrates through the case of Drinko that improvisation takes place in trials to render the ERP constructed network sufficient stability and channel different actors to perform their required roles in order for the implementation network to achieve its objectives. 

The study reveals that the application of different translations strategies in order to recruit and align various actors could result in creating multiple perceptions of the project and its goals, which affects the coherence of actors’ perception of the project and understanding of the required deliverables. Improvisation is then required to find a convergence point for the actors involved that keeps them interested and enrolled in the project, yet at the same time working and delivering coherent parts of the system.

Project management had to redefine the project for all the parties involved and find an objective that could funnel the interests of the actors and realign them to accomplish the implementation project. They had to find a central theme that all actors can relate and subscribe to. Through brainstorming sessions, they realised that unifying the business is what they want from this system and hence launched it as the new solo objective of the project and created a visual two-coloured logo for the project to convey the message. The shift of the project objectives and the creation of a representative logo came about as tinkering of the project direction upon management realisation that different BUs and teams perceive the system in a different way. 

The case also highlighted the contribution of the actors’ background and origin on the instability of the network, which required bricolage in discovering ways to stabilise the network. The descending of main organisational actors from two primary networks was a constant source of improvisation in Drinko. Although successfully recruited and enrolled into the project network, these actors maintained membership with their primary networks. On two occasions, this relationship resulted in the polarisation of the implementation project, requiring the development of alternative plans and responses from the project management team. 

In one occasion, the UK teams negotiated and advocated new terms to continue their alignment and support for the project based on dismissing most of EUB members. Having provided a convincing case for the management, the latter responded in approval of a restructuring exercise of the project teams involved resulted in reducing them to three instead of the previous five and hence get rid of marginalise EUB teams’ members in this process. The change of teams’ structure was an improvised action that emerged out of controversy and dissatisfaction of UK teams and their success to enrol the top management and convince them that EUB team members hinder the proper development of the system. 

On a subsequent occasion, controversy arose regarding the decision on where to locate the shared service centre. UK negotiated to own the shared service centre and Drinko management were aware that if they go with this request they would loose EUB crucial support of the project, and if they do not they would loose the efficiency of the shared service centre that UK people is capable to achieve as they have been convinced by UK. The alternative action satisfied both the UK and EUB BUs by locating a service centre in each country. This unplanned course of action ensured their continued participation in the project and the stability of the network. It emerged as a solution to the organisational othering of the EUB BU (Elbanna, 2007). Although appealing to the actors in the network, the outcome of a dual service centre compromised Dirnko’s system capability and delivered a costly and awkward structure for an integrated system that was not originally planned for or budgeted. 

Drinko’s SAP implementation highlighted how negotiation and action occurring at one stage of the network building affects the future direction of the project. An example of this is the negotiation that resulted in the withdrawal of the American BU from the project. Drinko management recognised that a similar risk existed with EUB, which resulted in the subsequent strategy to ‘embrace’ it in order to ensure its translation and participation in the project. The occurrence and enactment of the first event created a new reality for future organisational action and also a new way of thinking amongst senior management. Aligning the powerful actor of EUB location allowed the project team to obtain critical support for the subsequent negotiations with EUB, and ensured its participation in the project.

In contrast to the management thinking, the SAP project followed an improvisation pattern from the beginning. Senior management decision to embark on the project was based on the idea that SAP would benefit Drinko and the success of SmCo could be replicated in Drinko. This was despite the existence of a struggling SAP solution in the UK BU at the time. The decision to embark on the investment in SAP was not a pure rational decision based on information gathering, comparing alternatives including different strategies and other types of ERP, and choosing the most viable one as is usually portrayed in the literature (Parr and Shanks, 2000). Nor did such a process commence by defining clear business objectives for the ERP investment (Markus et al., 2000). This finding is congruent with Avgerou’s (2000) position that IS tends to be taken for granted and institutionalised, despite the vagueness of its actual benefits. 





This study responds to the invitation extended by many improvisation researchers to apply the improvisation approach to studies of technologies other than open-ended systems (Orlikowski, 1996; Yates et al., 1999). A detailed depiction has been made of how the implementation of ERP within Drinko followed an improvisation pattern. Implementation was characterised by high contingencies and adherence to work around the plan to obtain solutions to emerging issues. None of these were envisaged beforehand or were incorporated in the ERPs implementation plan. The ‘after the fact’ presentation of the project followed a managerial agenda that depicted it as a well planned endeavour that delivered planned ‘outcome’. This is in line with Ciborra’s observation that formal managerial presentation slides represent a glossy surface superficially extracted and removed from practice (Ciborra, 2002). 

The negotiation that took place in the process of interesting and enrolling different actors into the project network and the constant trials to achieve sufficient stability of the network present occasions for different actors to open the project black box and negotiate new terms for the alignment. This provides an understanding of the actors’ need for improvisation and acting out of plans, which results in an ability to negotiate, find common ground and new terms that guarantee the alignment of the actors. The unfolding course of events following the opening of the project black box could not have been predicted at the beginning, and hence could not have been addressed through a structured approach of methods and plans. 

Different actors not only can bring about different terms for joining the project or for the continuation of their recruitment, which invites improvisation and ability to negotiate, but they could also bring different perception of the project itself that could confuse its objectives. These unfolding perceptions require monitoring and confrontation as they surface, which no plans could foresee, and no a priori action could tackle. 

Analysis of the case study results in reflection on the general assumption that an IS development methodology is a way of documenting the system to facilitate the joining in of new staff and the upgrading of the system (Hirschheim et al., 1995). This case study suggests that such a notion might be applicable to the technical side of the project, but not to the organisational side. The project documentation portrayed a ‘tidy story’ of procedures, steps, and approvals. None of the ‘messy’ stories or explanations of why the system took the form it did were documented apart from few hints in the confidential and highly restricted minutes of the ERP programme board. New staff would not obtain an explanation on some organisational aspects of the system, such as having two data centres existed in Drinko UK and the EUB, or excluding a significant BU from the organisation-wide SAP implementation system scope, or interfacing what is supposed to be integrated single system with many others that offer similar functions.

This case shows that what was previously reported as highly structured implementation of ERP systems (Brown and Vessey, 1999; Krumbholz et al., 2000; Rebstock and Selig, 2000; Al-Mudimigh et al., 2001) is in practice an ongoing process that mixed seeing and doing. This is in line with Minztberg and Westley’s (2001) and Minzberg’s (1987) notion that people take actions one-by-one, then respond to them so that patterns eventually form. Evidence from the case demonstrates that improvisation and drift took place on both the technology and organisational side at Drinko. This extends the drift argument, from considering only drift on the technology side (Ciborra, 2000a; Ciborra and Associates, 2000) and seeing only technology ‘running away’ (Hanseth et al., 2001) towards incorporating the organisation acts of improvisation, bricolage, and drift. 

This study illustrates that even highly structured projects encompassing rigid technology such as ERP enjoy a similar approach of improvisation that was previously attributed to low-cost, low-risk projects of malleable technology such as groupware, intranet, and Internet (Ciborra, 2000b). The findings invite practitioners to reflect on ERP implementation practices and review their evaluation methods with a view to embracing improvisation and bricolage. The application of ANT in the study of improvisation provides an insightful interactive framework that assists in detecting the inner dynamics of the process of implementing ERP. This extends beyond the appearances of plans, methodology, and measurements to reveal the improvisation and bricolage activities that take place during the organisational efforts to implement the large and complex packaged software. 

Analysis of the case study results applying ANT reveals that improvisation is inherent in the process of network building as actors actively interpret their interests in relation to others, and act accordingly. This provides a new insight into the sources and processes of improvisation.





1 ERP systems often come with their own implementation methodologies. The implementation methodology for SAP R/3 for example is called ASAP.
2 Bricolage is a French word that means to use whatever resources and repertoire one has to perform whatever task one faces.
3 For more information about this argument and whether it follows a technologically deterministic paradigm, see: Winner (1977) and Bimber (1994).
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